On the Assertion of Philosophical Doubt

Dialogue 10 (1):82-91 (1971)
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Abstract

Familiar arguments against scepticism are explicated in terms of a distinction between logical possibility and assertibility. Certain consistent sceptical propositions are unassertible.

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10.1017/s0012217300032406

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Evan Simpson
Memorial University of Newfoundland

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Moore's Modal Argument.R. L. Purtill - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):236 - 243.

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