The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of consciousness has not adequately distinguished between the following two claims. (Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M. (The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M. While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory: (The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.

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Nicholas Silins
Cornell University

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References found in this work

The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.

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