Oxford University Press UK (2009)
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| Abstract |
Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. Subjective Consciousness is a fascinating new move forward towards a full understanding of the mind.
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| Keywords | Consciousness Mental representation |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2011 |
| Buy this book | $37.95 new Amazon page |
| Call number | B808.9.S83 2009 |
| ISBN(s) | 9780199570355 9780199694709 0199694702 0199570353 |
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Citations of this work BETA
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness.Richard Brown, Hakwan Lau & Joseph E. LeDoux - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (9):754-768.
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