Abstract

The Indian philosophical schools divide the types of cognitions mainly as recollection and non-recollection. The set of non-recollections is termed as experiential cognitions ( anubhava ). Two issues about recollection and experience are discussed in this paper. One is defining recollection and distinguishing a recollection from similar types of cognitions. The second one is the validity of recollection. With regard to the validity of recollection, views of three philosophers namely Prabhākara, Gaṅgeśa and Udayana, are discussed and compared. All the three consider recollection as not valid although the reasons put forth by them for such a consideration differs. While briefly analyzing these views, the paper shows that somehow the concept of validity is relevant only in case of experiential cognitions. In this process, the paper puts an effort to pin down a particular feature present in all the experiential cognitions that can account for the distinction of the experience from a recollection and can justify the invalidity of recollection.