Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6

(ed.)
Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.

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9780199606382   9780199606375   0199606374   0199606382

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Chapters

A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism.Campbell Brown
Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood
Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism.Jonas Olson
How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts.Allan Gibbard
Instrumental Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood
Moral Knowledge and Experience.Sarah McGrath
Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel
Parfit's Case against Subjectivism.David Sobel
The Accidental Error Theorist.Richard Joyce
Why be An Internalist about Reasons?Julia Markovits
Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have it Both Ways.  (pages 1-32)Sharon Street
Passing the Deontic Buck.  (pages 128)Matt Bedke

Similar books and articles

Instrumental Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
The Accidental Error Theorist.Richard Joyce - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Moral Knowledge and Experience.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism.Campbell Brown - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Parfit's Case against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Why be An Internalist about Reasons?Julia Markovits - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.

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Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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