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How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts
In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press (2011)
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Citations of this work
Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT".Alex Silk - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 203-245.
Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.
I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
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