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Ethical disagreement, ethical objectivism and moral indeterminacy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):331-344 (1994)
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Citations of this work
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents.Aimee van Wynsberghe & Scott Robbins - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics 25 (3):719-735.
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents.Aimee van Wynsberghe & Scott Robbins - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-17.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
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