Abstract

Taken as a whole this book is not by Collingwood as much as it is about him. The selections read like extended quotations marshalled to defend and justify Rubinoff's interpretation of Collingwood which he sets forth in the introductions. Rubinoff admits, however, that the selections are arranged according to his interpretation of Collingwood which is roughly as follows: religion begins its development in a dogmatic stage characterized by feeling and emotion in which it views itself as a separate and autonomous form of life claiming absolute truth for itself. From this stage of pure faith it passes to a stage of reason, the transition offering the possibility of a "philosophical rapprochement between faith and reason." In the process it turns out that art and philosophy are also engaged in this effort of mind-trying-to-know-itself and thus become identified with one another in that respect. The rapprochement between faith and reason is still inadequate at this stage as it over-emphasizes the identity of faith and reason while underplaying their differences. Thus a dialectical theory of truth and reality as overlapping modes of being is needed to show that faith and reason are distinct but not separate areas. The whole process sees religion as first a form of self-making, then in terms of the self constituting itself as a self, and finally as a form of absolute self-making. The book should not be considered as other than an exercise in historical theology. Collingwood has little to bring to current theological discussion. In fact Rubinoff's comments are often more provocative than Collingwood's, presenting what is important in Collingwood and offering interpretations that charitably enhance his relevance.--S. O. H.