Evolution of human jealousy a just-so story or a just-so criticism?
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (4):427-443 (2003)
Abstract
To operationalize the methodological assessment of evolutionary psychology, three requirements are proposed that, if satisfied, would show that a hypothesis is not a just-so story: (1) theoretical entrenchment (i.e., that the hypothesis under consideration is a consequence of a more fundamental theory that is empirically well-confirmed across a very wide range of phenomena), (2) predictive success (i.e., that the hypothesis generates concrete predictions that make it testable and eventually to a certain extent corroborated), and (3) failure of rival explanations (i.e., that crucial and successful predictions attributed to the hypothesis in question cannot be derived from alternative hypotheses). The author argues that the hypothesis about evolutionary sex differences in human jealousy satisfies all three requirements. Key Words: evolutionary psychology adaptationism philosophy of science testability.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1177/0048393103257964
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Citations of this work
A Brief (Hi)Story of Just-So Stories in Evolutionary Science.Michal Hubálek - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (5):447-468.
Cognitive/Evolutionary Psychology and the History of Racism.John P. Jackson - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):296-314.
Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
Mating Intelligence, Moral Virtues, and Methodological Vices.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2010 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 13--22.
References found in this work
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.