Kant and Covid Ethics

Kantian Journal 43 (1):103-127 (2024)
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Abstract

Despite the popularity of many of Kant’s ethical notions, such as autonomy, dignity and respect for persons, there is a perception, even among Kant scholars themselves, that one cannot reliably derive concrete duties from Kant’s moral philosophy. Against this, I shall argue that — properly understood — Kant’s ethics is of prime importance even today. I shall argue that Kant’s preferred procedure is actually the way we develop new ethical rules during the recent Coronavirus pandemic. In order to demonstrate this, I shall first reflect on how we came up with ethical rules such as keeping six feet of distance, wearing a mask, or restricting the number of people who can occupy a room at the same time. I shall then give the reasons why I do not follow the standard interpretations of how one derives concrete duties from Kant’s main formulation of the Categorical Imperative or the Formula of Humanity. Finally, I shall present the textual evidence that Kant proposes a method like the one we use today during a pandemic, and argue that this alternative interpretation can deal much better with the main objections that are commonly levelled against the standard interpretation of Kant’s procedure to derive concrete duties from the Categorical Imperative.

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Oliver Sensen
Tulane University

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The Practice of Moral Judgment.Barbara Herman - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414.
Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior.John Harsanyi - 1977 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 44 (4):623-656.

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