Proper scoring rules, dominated forecasts, and coherence

Abstract

De Finetti introduced the concept of coherent previsions and conditional previsions through a gambling argument and through a parallel argument based on a quadratic scoring rule. He shows that the two arguments lead to the same concept of coherence. When dealing with events only, there is a rich class of scoring rules which might be used in place of the quadratic scoring rule. We give conditions under which a general strictly proper scoring rule can replace the quadratic scoring rule while preserving the equivalence of de Finetti’s two arguments. In proving our results, we present a strengthening of the usual minimax theorem. We also present generalizations of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem of prevision to deal with conditional previsions.

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2009-01-28

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Teddy Seidenfeld
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
Why be coherent?Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):405-415.
The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.

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