Forecasting with Imprecise Probabilities

Abstract

We review de Finetti’s two coherence criteria for determinate probabilities: coherence1defined in terms of previsions for a set of events that are undominated by the status quo – previsions immune to a sure-loss – and coherence2 defined in terms of forecasts for events undominated in Brier score by a rival forecast. We propose a criterion of IP-coherence2 based on a generalization of Brier score for IP-forecasts that uses 1-sided, lower and upper, probability forecasts. However, whereas Brier score is a strictly proper scoring rule for eliciting determinate probabilities, we show that there is no real-valuedstrictly proper IP-score. Nonetheless, with respect to either of two decision rules – Γ-maximin or E-admissibility-+-Γ-maximin – we give a lexicographic strictly proper IP-scoring rule that is based on Brier score.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Calibration, coherence, and scoring rules.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):274-294.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-23

Downloads
49 (#318,154)

6 months
14 (#170,561)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Teddy Seidenfeld
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references