Proper names and intentionality

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3):205-225 (1982)
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explain how an account of proper names can be incorporated into a general account of the intentionality of mind and language. I show that such an account supports the so-Called descriptivist conception of proper names and in so doing I answer the objections of causal theorists

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2017

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10.1111/j.1468-0114.1982.tb00100.x

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John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Understanding proper names.Michael McKinsey - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
How to infer what persistent things are up to – a Fregean puzzle for traditional Fregeans.Johan Gersel - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):92-121.
Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle.Anna Mahtani - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2077-2100.

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