At "permanent risk": Reasoning and self-knowledge in self-deception

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):576-603 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay, I defend the following two claims: reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and , the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to and , I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term "traditionalists," and those we might term "deflationists.".

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Seeing Through Self-Deception, by Annette Barnes. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):242-245.
What is the role of the self in self-deception?Richard Holton - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
Self-deception and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
The Ubiquity of Self‐Deception.Rick Fairbanks - 1998 - Philosophical Investigations 21 (1):1–23.
Self-deception and internal irrationality.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):31-56.
The Duty of Self-Knowledge.Owen Ware - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.
Self-Deception and Practical Reasoning.Robert Audi - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):247 - 266.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
18 (#860,222)

6 months
291 (#7,856)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.
Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Being and nothingness.Jean-Paul Sartre - 1956 - Avenel, N.J.: Random House.
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

View all 24 references / Add more references