16 found
  1. On belief and the captivity of the will.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):77-103.
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  2. How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  3.  58
    Motivated believing: Wishful and unwelcome.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2000 - Noûs 34 (3):348–375.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  4. At "permanent risk": Reasoning and self-knowledge in self-deception.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):576-603.
    In this essay, I defend the following two claims: reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and , the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to and , I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term "traditionalists," and those we might term "deflationists.".
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  5. Self-deception and internal irrationality.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):31-56.
    I characterize a notion of internal irrationality which is central to hard cases of self-deception. I argue that if we aim to locate such internal irrationality in the _process of self-deception, we must fail. The process of self-deception, I claim, is a wholly arational affair. If we are to make a place for internal irrationality we must turn our attention to the _state of self-deception. I go on to argue that we are able to offer an account of this peculiar (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  6.  21
    Self-Deceptive Inquiry.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:457-482.
    I develop the claim that paradigmatic cases of self-deceptive inquiry and belief-formation result from cognitive disorientation. In cognitive disorientation, the data, experiences, and practices we make use of in typical inquiry lead us awry in systematic fashion. The self-deceiver encounters a puzzle or a threat to her picture of the world; this doubt or uncertainty gives rise to questions she struggles to settle. Drawing on the theory of cognitive dissonance, I show that while taking herself to be engaged in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  40
    High anxiety: Barnes on what moves the unwelcome believer.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):313 – 326.
    Wishful thinking and self-deception are instances of motivated believing. According to an influential view, the motivated believer is moved by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; i.e. the motive of the motivated believer is strictly hedonic--typically, the reduction of anxiety. This anxiety reduction account would, however, appear to face a serious challenge: cases of unwelcome motivated believing [Barnes (1997) Seeing through self-deception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Scott-Kakures (2000) Motivated believing: wishful and unwelcome, Nous, 34, 348-375] or "twisted" (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  8.  21
    Can You Succeed in Intentionally Deceiving Yourself?Dion Scott-Kakures Scott-Kakures - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):17-40.
    According to intentionalists, self-deceivers exercise the sort of control over their belief-forming processes that, in standard cases of interpersonal deception, the deceiver exercises over the deceived’s belief forming processes — they intentionally deceive themselves. I’ll argue here that interpersonal deception is not an available model for the sort of putatively distinctive control the self-deceiver exercises over her belief-forming processes and beliefs. I concentrate attention on a kind of case in which an agent allegedly intentionally causes herself to come to have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9.  70
    Unsettling Questions: Cognitive Dissonance in Self-Deception.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):73-106.
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  77
    Review of Self-Deception Unmasked. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):696-701.
  11.  30
    Seeing Through Self-Deception, by Annette Barnes. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):242-245.
    At the center of Annette Barnes’s impressive contribution to the burgeoning literature on self-deception is her effort to adjudicate the dispute between, as I’ll call them, traditionalists and deflationists. Traditionalists insist that the process of self-deception must be mediated by an intention. As Barnes points out, such a view appears “doubly paradoxical”, in that it seems to require that.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  12.  13
    Review of Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):498-500.
  13.  10
    Erstwhile vindicationism.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3):205-223.
  14.  67
    Self-knowledge, akrasia, and self-criticism.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):267-295.
  15.  12
    Review of George Ainslie, Breakdown of Will[REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8).
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
  16.  9
    Review of Clancy Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception[REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6).