Abstract

A number of philosophers have found nuclear deterrence morally objectionable due to its violating a cluster of very attractive nonconsequentialist moral principles. And some philosophers who find deterrence morally acceptable are nonetheless deeply troubled by the conflict—or apparent conflict—between nuclear deterrence and these nonconsequentialist moral principles. In this essay I argue that neither set of philosophers has correctly understood the role of these nonconsequentialist principles in the issue of nuclear weapons policies. I shall argue that the “understanding” of the role of these principles in making moral judgements is incorrect, and that the approach to issues of public policy taken by both camps is methodologically defective. In the end, I do not prove that nuclear deterrence is morally acceptable; to establish that, more must be done than is doable in a paper of this length. What I do show, however, is how that matter ought to be decided. I also show that the moral rejections of nuclear deterrence that have been proposed to date are fatally flawed.