The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God

Oxford: Oxford University Press UK (2015)
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Abstract

In many places and times, and for many people, God's existence has been rather less than a clear fact. According to the hiddenness argument, this is actually a reason to suppose that it is not a fact at all. The hiddenness argument is a new argument for atheism that has come to prominence in philosophy over the past two decades. J. L. Schellenberg first developed the argument in 1993, and this book offers a short and vigorous statement of its central claims and ideas. Logically sharp but so clear that anyone can understand, the book addresses little-discussed issues such as why it took so long for hiddenness reasoning to emerge in philosophy, and how the hiddenness problem is distinct from the problem of evil. It concludes with the fascinating thought that retiring the last of the personal gods might leave us nearer the beginning of religion than the end.

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J. L. Schellenberg
Mount Saint Vincent University

Citations of this work

Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.
Atheism and Dialetheism; or, ‘Why I Am Not a (Paraconsistent) Christian’.Zach Weber - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):401-407.
Against Theistic Personalism: What Modern Epistemology does to Classical Theism.Roger Pouivet - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (1):1-19.

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