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Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):422-475 (2019)
Abstract
ABSTRACTAndrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.Links
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Citations of this work
Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-42.
Conceptual engineering for analytic theology.Patrick Greenough, Jean Gové & Ian Church - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.
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