Prejudice, prudence and fairness

Abstract

There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The Possibility of Inductive Moral Arguments.Mark T. Nelson - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):231-246.
Reasoning without Comparing.David K. Chan - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):153-164.
Perfectionism and Moral Reasoning.Matteo Falomi - 2010 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2 (2):85-100.
Moral reasoning.Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Rational framing effects and morally valid reasons.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 247 (45):e247.
Educating for Practical Reasoning.Thomas Magnell - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11:233-239.
Thinking about Reported Miracles.Timothy McGrew - 2016 - In Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee & David Coady (eds.), A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 555–566.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-02

Downloads
16 (#934,417)

6 months
5 (#711,233)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Add more references