No unchallengeable epistemic authority, of any sort, regarding our own conscious experience

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113 (2007)
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Abstract

Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about

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Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental.Richard Rorty - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (June):399-424.

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