How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation

Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
197 (#97,078)

6 months
15 (#145,565)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
What is it like to be me?Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.

Add more references