Numbers as ontologically dependent objects hume’s principle revisited

Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):353-373 (2011)
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Abstract

Adherents of Ockham’s fundamental razor contend that considerations of ontological parsimony pertain primarily to fundamental objects. Derivative objects, on the other hand, are thought to be quite unobjectionable. One way to understand the fundamental vs. derivative distinction is in terms of the Aristotelian distinction between ontologically independent and dependent objects. In this paper I will defend the thesis that every natural number greater than 0 is an ontologically dependent object thereby exempting the natural numbers from Ockham’s fundamental razor.

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Robert Schwartzkopff
University of Oxford (DPhil)

References found in this work

On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
Parts: a study in ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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