In
Wittgenstein's Later Theory of Meaning. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 21–34 (
2013)
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Abstract
In this chapter the author looks at how Wittgenstein applies his method of creating simple language games to discuss fundamental questions in the Philosophical Investigations and its preliminary works. Wittgenstein seems to think that numerals can be learned alone, demonstratively, without further linguistic context. He altogether ignores Frege's preferred interpretation “that the content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept,” which, for Wittgenstein, would mean, among other things, that numerals can only be learned and used in conjunction with other words. The chapter highlights that a simple language game becomes expanded through the introduction of expressions of the category of proper names with a consideration of the Philosophical Investigations, which at first glance appears to have something to say about the interplay of proper names and concept terms in the building of a sentence.