Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43 (2018)

Noell Birondo
University of Texas at El Paso
T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way toward a satisfying non-reductive position in metaethics, one that embodies the ontological modesty that disavows any appeal to a ‘special metaphysical reality’ in Scanlon’s sense.
Keywords T. M. Scanlon  Reasons Fundamentalism
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Reprint years 2018
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201834233
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
Ethics Without Ontology.Hilary Putnam - 2004 - Harvard University Press.

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