McDowell v. Kripke: Práctica comunitaria y semántica de condiciones De verdad

Análisis Filosófico 25 (1):21-44 (2005)
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Abstract

Este trabajo explora las críticas de McDowell a la argumentación de Kripke en Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language y analiza su propuesta positiva, el ofrecimiento de un hecho semántico primitivo. Su idea es que el resultado escéptico alcanzado por Kripke resulta de no haber desechado la identificación entre significado e interpretación. Al contrario, el marco para dar cuenta de la noción de significado es la práctica: los hechos semánticos primitivos -elaborables a través de una semántica de condiciones de verdad- son constituidos en la práctica comunitaria, y de ellos tenemos una captación individual. En mi opinión no sólo la crítica de McDowell a Kripke es errada, sino que su propuesta positiva presenta problemas fundamentales, tanto en su concepción de la normatividad como en sus aspectos epistémicos. El corolario de este trabajo será mostrar que el verdadero problema para una teoría semántica es la identificación del significado con cualquier tipo de hecho y no meramente la identificación del significado con la interpretación. This paper explores McDowell's criticisms to Kripke's argumentation in his Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, and analyses his positive proposal, that is, the offering of a primitive semantic fact. His idea is that the skeptical result reached by Kripke depends on not having discarded the identification between meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, the ITamework to explain the notion of meaning is the practice: the primitive semantic facts - that may be established by truth-values semantics - are constituted by the communitarian practice, and we get an individual insight of them. In my view, not only the criticism of McDowell to Kripke is erroneous, but also his positive proposal presents fundamental problems, in his conception ofnormativity as well as in his epistemic aspects. The conclusion of this paper will be to show how the real problem for a semantic theory is the identification ofmeaning with any kind of fact and not only the identification of meaning and interpretation

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Glenda Satne
University of Wollongong

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References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
Wittgenstein on following a rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
Non-cognitivism and rule-following.John McDowell - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.

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