Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):439-471 (2012)

Alexander Sarch
University of Surrey
The ‘adjustment strategy’ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of well‐being. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach – namely, that employed by ‘partially objective multi‐component theories.’ Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multi‐component theories fails, so I proceed to investigate more sophisticated ways to formulate such a theory. I conclude that one of these – the Discount/Inflation Theory – is particularly promising.
Keywords Well-Being
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1111/papq.2012.93.issue-4
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,214
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Robust Hybrid Theory of Well-Being.Steven Wall & David Sobel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2829-2851.
Hybrid Theories.Christopher Woodard - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 161-174.
Monism and Pluralism About Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-157.
Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.
The Worst Things in Life.Wayne Sumner - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):419-432.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories.Peter Smith - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277.
Syntactic Characterization of Closure Under Connected Limits.Michel Hébert - 1991 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 31 (2):133-143.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
Having Reason in Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
Teorías Y Significado.Eloy Rada - 1985 - Theoria 1 (1):185-212.
The Structure of Theoretical Progress.Geoffrey Alexander Joseph Gorham - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
Multi-Use and Constraints From Original Use.Justin A. Jungé & Daniel C. Dennett - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):277-278.
Multi‐Term Π‐Institutions and Their Equivalence.José Gil-Férez - 2006 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 52 (5):505-526.


Added to PP index

Total views
165 ( #71,074 of 2,507,555 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,014 of 2,507,555 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes