Platón y Aristóteles frente al problema de la cualidad

Areté. Revista de Filosofía 12 (1):67-90 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper purports toshow that it is not necessary to read the early Platonic dialogues starting from the "classic" theory of Forms. It argues, instead, that it is possibleto analyze them and, above all, to explain the use of the vocabulary of "presence" starting from the more general and prior possibility of distinguishing a subject from its accidental predicates, especially quality. The relation of "present in" or "being in" to which Plato recurs. is inherited by Aristotle. The distinction between "being said about something as asubject" and "being in something as in a subject" (Categories 2) seems to be a"natural" development of Platonic ontology. It is argued that the Aristotelian conception is closer to the earlier than to the intermediate dialogues

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