There is a substantial difference between our way of "philosophizing", born out of Descartes' clear and well-defined thinking and bent on building alternative (aut-aut) models, and the classical (especially Platonic-Aristotelian) way where a constant use of technical and methodical pluralism serves to juxtapose different (et-et) schemes necessary to grasp an intrinsically one-manifold reality. The ancient Philosophers bring a great wealth of schemes into play, albeit in different forms. This is to say that one could also come across statements that are (...) clearly mismatched and sometimes even at odds with one another, without either giving rise to a real contradiction or (even less so) a quasi relativistic viewpoint. Quite the contrary, an approach of this kind focuses on the necessary knowledge of a reality which, however, is multiform. By assuming this interpretative paradigm and applying it to some of the most pivotal reflections of the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, the Authors of the contributions herein provide a number of particularly eloquent examples of that typically "Greek" movement, which is to proceed steadily by association of possibilities, rejecting the either/or solicitations and hinging their reflections upon the more open and dynamic "and-and" combination. The authors believe that many of the puzzles of Ancient philosophy that have involved and divided scholars can acquire a new and convincing explanation with this paradigm. (shrink)

A partir de un caso presentado en el Eutifrón (2a-5d), se analiza la contraposición, latente ya en la época de Platón, entre, de un lado, un orden de justicia ideal y universal, válido para todo hombre en cuanto hombre, y, de otro lado, las leyes positivas propias de una determinada comunidad o las acciones particulares de sus miembros. Esta contraposición es concebida en una perspectiva que se orienta tanto al futuro como al pasado: en el primer caso, se reconoce en (...) ella un estadío muy antiguo de la reflexión filosófica y jurídica, que lleva hasta la definición de los “derechos humanos”; en el segundo caso, se analizan los modos en que Platón sugiere, particularmente en algunos pasajes de las Leyes, la posibilidad de efectuar una mediación entre lo “justo en sí” y la justicia de las leyes positivas particulares o de las acciones de los individuos.---“Is it just to accuse one’s own father of homicide for having let a dependant die? Ref lect ions on human r ights in Plato”. From a case presented in Euthyphro (2a-5d), the paper analyzes the contraposition, already latent in Plato’s time, between, on the one hand, an ideal and universal order of justice, valid for any human as such and, on the other, the positive laws of a specific community or the particular actions of its members. This contraposition is conceived from a perspective oriented as much towards the future as towards the past: in the first case, a very old stage of philosophical and juridical reflections is recognized in it that leads to the definition of “human rights”; in the second case, the paper analyzes the ways in which Plato suggests the possibility, particularly in some passages of the Laws, of performing a mediation between “the just in itself” and the justice of particular positive laws or the actions of individuals. (shrink)

La autora aborda el problema de los entes matemáticos intermedios analizando MetafiSica l017a9-l4, por ser este pasaje, simultáneamente, fuente ycrítica de la teoría que Aristóteles atribuye a Platón. El objetivo es identificar cuatro puntos de orientación que ofrezcan una base para el diálogo entre las encontradas posiciones respecto del problema. Gracias a ellos, se pone de manifiesto que Aristóteles aborda la cuestión de la naturaleza inteligible de los entes matemáticos recortándola -con el bisturí del aparato conceptual de su propia ousiología- (...) de la perspectiva mucho más ampliade Platón. Al romper la continuidad entre matemática y dialéctica. Aristóteles"reduce" y demuele la imagen de la concepción matemática de Platón. (shrink)