Spacing Imagination. Husserl and the Phenomenology of Imagination
Abstract
Although imagination is not one of the subjects treated extensively in Husserl's phenomenology, it is one of its most important 'instruments'. In his phenomenology as a work of imagination, imagination even acquires for Husserl primacy over perception. But in his phenomenology of imagination as its subject matter, Husserl seems to repeat the old distinction between original and image in his differentiation between perception as the reaIization of full bodily presence and imagination as referring to inferior modes of presence.
The author criticaIly analyses Husserl's distinction (within imagination) between phantasy and image-consciousness. The fact that Husserl describes the image-object in image-consciousness as a "mere image" which appears only as "a nothing" on the scene of actual presence, and the fact that Husserl distinguishes phantasy from image-consciousness by its lacking any representational consciousness, leads one to suspect greatly that Husserl reverts to a contentbased approach which was to have been excluded by his theory of intentionaIity.
In the last section the author outlines a reorientation according to which imagination is thought of not in reference to presence (as has been done in the history of metaphysics), but in reference to an appearing, an imaging, a showing, that would never be a matter simply of presence, but rather of spacings that would fracture presence. This conception of imagination could explain the power of imagination to open up phenomenology.