Phantasms and physical imagination in Husserl’s theory of pictorialization

Anuario Filosófico 51 (2):325-345 (2018)
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Abstract

The aim of the article is to argue against the claim that Edmund Husserl does not adequately distinguish physical imagination from phantasy in his early texts. Thus, the article examines Husserl’s early theory of imagination according to which phantasy and image consciousness (understood as physical imagination) have a similar structure of pictorialization but differ with respect to apprehension contents and the number of apprehended objects: phantasy involves phantasms and two apprehended objects but physical imagination involves sensations and can have three apprehended objects.

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Regina-Nino Mion (née Kurg)
Estonian Academy of Arts

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