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Why computers can't act
American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):157-163 (1981)
Abstract
To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Citations of this work
Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic Information.Orlin Vakarelov - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (3):327-351.
From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic Information.Orlin Vakarelov - 2013 - Minds and Machines (3):1-25.
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