Flew, Marx and Gnosticism

Philosophy 68 (263):94 - 98 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Professor Flew has recently sought to demolish the philosophical pretensions of Marx and the Marxists by the use of Hume's Fork and Popper's demand for falsifiable consequences. Marx tried to derive matters of ‘fact and existence’ from ‘relations of ideas’, which Hume's Fork states to be impossible. From this and not from empirical study, he derived predictions for the future course of history which neither he nor his followers have ever properly tested by empirical enquiries. Nor have they ever provided any clear, unambiguous and therefore testable formulations of those predictions. In particular, Flew claims, they have never given any concrete content to the central notion of ‘alienation’ such that an Index of Alienation could be drawn up and enquiries could be made as to whether, for example, the workers are more or less alienated under the private or public ownership of factories. Both faults stem from Marx's continuation of German, specifically Hegelian, philosophy

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Karl Marx on Property.Thomas William Keyes - 1981 - Dissertation, Marquette University
Alienation in the Older Marx.Mark Cowling - 2006 - Contemporary Political Theory 5 (3):319-339.
Alienation in the Older Marx.Nancy Fraser - 2006 - Contemporary Political Theory 5 (3):319-339.
Alienação, Exteriorização e Reflexão em Hegel e Marx.Agemir Bavaresco, Christian Iber & Eduardo Garcia Lara - 2019 - Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (54):99-118.
An Analysis of Marx's Idea of Human Nature. Hung-te - 1997 - Philosophy and Culture 24 (5):406-419.
Marx, Rationalism and the Critique of the Market.Tony Fluxman - 2009 - South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):377-413.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
23 (#160,613)

6 months
2 (#1,816,284)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations