Abstract

Olafson's central contention is that it is possible and worthwhile to disengage the elements of an ethical theory from the ontological terminology which the existentialists use and to relate this theory to philosophers who do not share the ontological orientation of continental philosophers. In effect, this means attempting to show the intelligibility of an existential ethics to philosophers primarily acquainted with ethics as it is treated by analytic philosophers. He performs this task extremely well beginning with a historical section that seeks out some of the anticipations of an existentialist ethics and sketches the tradition that existentialists have attacked. While Olafson recognizes the differences among existentialists, the emphasis here is on continuity and similarity. Olafson is excellent in attacking many of the myths and biases that have clouded our understanding and assessment of existentialist ethics, although one senses that in his attempt to defend the plausibility of an existentialist ethics, he skirts the specter of nihilism that hovers over so much of existentialism.--R. J. B.