Unknowable Obligations

Utilitas 7 (2):247-271 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

You face two buttons. Pushing one will destroy Greensboro. Pushing the other will save it. There is no way for you to know which button saves and which destroys. What ought you to do? Answer: You ought to make the correct guess and push the button that saves Greensboro. Second question: Do you have an obligation to push the correct button?

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1017/s0953820800002077

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (2):273-279.
Access and Unknowable Obligations.Oleh Bondar - forthcoming - Filosofia Unisinos:1-16.
Negative and affirmative precepts.FrancisC Wade - 1978 - Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):269-279.
Will the mind figure out how the brain works?Steven Pinker - manuscript
All or Nothing, but If Not All, Next Best or Nothing.Theron Pummer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):278-291.
The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - In John Broome (ed.), Rationality Through Reasoning. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1-7.
I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
Do we have reasons to do as we believe we ought to do?Julian Fink - 2009 - In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79.
If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-30

Downloads
17 (#896,762)

6 months
175 (#19,236)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.
Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1890 - International Journal of Ethics 1 (1):120-121.

View all 16 references / Add more references