Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction

Utilitas 23 (3):316-323 (2011)
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Abstract

The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.

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10.1017/s0953820811000161

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Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal

Citations of this work

Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.
Philosophical papers.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by D. H. Mellor.

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