Utilitas 23 (3):316-323 (2011)

Authors
Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal
Abstract
The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820811000161
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - Cambridge University Press.

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