Individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs: the role of analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases

Thinking and Reasoning 28 (1):125-162 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasoning processes – such as lower analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases – that might lead to the adoption of such beliefs. In two studies, I constructed and tested a novel questionnaire on epistemically suspect beliefs (Study 1, N = 263), and used it to examine probabilistic reasoning biases and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning as predictors of the endorsement of those beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables (Study 2, N = 397). Probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted various epistemically suspect beliefs, whereas the effect of syllogistic belief bias was largely restricted to pseudoscientific beliefs. Further research will be needed to examine the role the biased evaluation of evidence plays in the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,853

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Role of Context in Belief Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Irrational Beliefs.Elly Vintiadis & Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - In Julien Musolino, Joseph Sommer & Pernille Hemmer (eds.), The Cognitive Science of Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92 - 110.
The Role of Certainty.Timm Triplett - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):171-190.
Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science.Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.
The God Allusion.Rafael Wlodarski & Eiluned Pearce - 2016 - Huamn Nature 27 (2):160-172.
Epistemically useful false beliefs.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):4-20.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-23

Downloads
18 (#832,589)

6 months
8 (#361,319)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?