Putnam’s cruzade against the fact/value dichotomy: Between the inevitability of the collapse and the defense of an alternative conception

Apuntes Filosóficos 27 (53):102-129 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The infamous fact/value dichotomy has been a controversial thesis that, especially during the twentieth century, has influenced the ethical andepistemological reflections within analytic philosophy, several non-philosophicaldisciplines like law and economics, and also the laymen way of thinking about moralsubjects. The dichotomy basically says that our statements of fact are objective and 103 Néstor Rodríguez  La cruzada de Putnam contra La Dicotomía Hecho/Valor… rational while our value judgments are, necessarily, subjective and, therefore, don`tdeserve to be rationally discussed. This way of thinking has been largely detrimentalto ethical reflection in general and various philosophers have been looking for a wayto argue against it and to promote its abandonment in order to recover talk of moralobjectivity. This article serves as a general review of the discussion concerning thefact/value dichotomy and its alleged collapse. We follow, as a guide, the work of the late American philosopher Hilary Putnamsince his has become the most significant when it comes to favor the abandonment ofthe dichotomy and the one most prominent in sketching an alternative perspective.According to this, the structure of the article puts forwards three sections. In the firstwe consider the arguments Putnam has in favor of the collapse of the fact/valuedichotomy. In the second we take a look at the ethical and metaethical landscapemodeled by the defense of the dichotomy and also at some of the assumptions thathave been linked to it. Finally, the third section presents briefly the alternativeposition Putnam offers in face of the inevitable collapse.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Disagreement and the" Fact/Value Entanglement".Ángel Manuel Faerna - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):245-264.
Putnam’s Alethic Pluralism and the Fact-Value Dichotomy.Pietro Salis - 2021 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 13 (2):1-16.
Giancarlo Marchetti, La contingenza dei fatti e l’ogggettività dei valori.Matteo Santarelli - 2014 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2).

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-02-23

Downloads
3 (#1,728,901)

6 months
1 (#1,516,021)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

4. Pragmatism and Nonscientific Knowledge.Hilary Putnam - 2017 - In Hilary Putnam & Ruth Anna Putnam (eds.), Pragmatism as a Way of Life: The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey, D. Macarthur (ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 55-70.
Why Is a Philosopher?Hilary Putnam - 1986 - In James Conant (ed.), Realism with a Human Face. Harvard University Press. pp. 105--19.
Introduction.Mario De Caro & Luca Illetterati - 2012 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):3-10.

Add more references