Moral Delusion

Philosophy 56 (217):313 - 331 (1981)
  Copy   BIBTEX


My question is whether a prevalent conception of morality can admit the existence of moral delusion. The conception of morality I refer to is that of a set of rules, or principles, ‘accepted’ or ‘assented’ to by persons, which stipulate that certain kinds of human act or behaviour are permitted, or required, while other kinds are to be avoided. This conception of morality can be found virtually everywhere, outside as much as within philosophy, in anthropology, sociology, political studies, history, literary criticism, psychology, and law. But it is to a particular philosophical instance that I shall attend here. The instance in question is an essay by Jonathan Bennett which appeared in this journal seven years ago under the title ‘The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn’. My reason for addressing myself to Bennett's paper will become clear as I proceed



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,826

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

61 (#205,590)

6 months
1 (#479,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Understanding the moral phenomenology of the third Reich.Geoffrey Scarre - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (4):423-445.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.

Add more references