Abstract

The relationship between the first and second parts of The Deadly Disease is problematic. The standard reading says that the first part develops an anthropological interpretation of the self and the second a theological interpretation of the self. But this interpretation collides with the initial definition of the self as a derivative relationship that relates to the power that has placed it. This article aims to provide an answer to this question. Our thesis is that the solution to this difficulty is the notion of "Religiosity A." Kierkegaard distinguishes two types of religiosity: one of them falls within the sphere of immanence, the other within the sphere of transcendence. "Religiosity A" maintains the ethical assumption that the eternal is humanly accessible, except that, while in the case of ethics, self-choice and fulfillment of duties provide access to it. In the case of "Religiosity A," the relationship with the eternal is established through self-denial and is expressed in categories of interiority. "Religiosity A" is the universal necessary condition for any particular religion and, as such, does not depend on the revelation present in the sacred scriptures of any particular religion. First, we will summarize the three central concepts of "Religiosity A": renunciation, suffering, and guilt awareness. Secondly, we will try to show that the development of the desperate consciousness of The Deadly Disease corresponds to the existential movement of "Religiosity A."