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Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the cap. A note
Theoria 20 (2):183-190 (2005)
Abstract
Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are providedAuthor Profiles
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References found in this work
A Canonical Model Construction For Substructural Logics With Strong Negation.N. Kamide - 2002 - Reports on Mathematical Logic:95-116.
A Routley-Meyer semantics for converse Ackermann property.José M. Méndez - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1):65 - 76.
Converse Ackermann croperty and semiclassical negation.José M. Méndez - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (2):159 - 168.
Restricting the contraction axiom in Dummett's LC: a sublogic of LC with the Converse Ackermann Property, the logic LCo.Francisco Salto, José M. Méndez & Gemma Robles - 2001 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 30 (3):139-146.
Normal modal substructural logics with strong negation.Norihiro Kamide - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):589-612.
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