Dissertation, University of Oklahoma (2019)

Seth Robertson
Harvard University
I argue that an adequate theory of rightness should meet two distinct conditions: a “Consequences Condition” according to which the rightness or wrongness of some, but not all acts should be determined conclusively by the act’s outcomes on welfare, and a “Character Condition” according to which the rightness or wrongness of some, but not all acts should be influenced partially by aspects of the moral character of the person who committed the act. The combination of these two conditions is interesting because many major normative theories capture one, but not both well. In the course of making the case for the Consequences and Character Conditions, I develop and argue for a novel version of metaethical Humean Constructivism that I call “perspectival naturalism,” which I then apply in support of the Consequences and Character Conditions.
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