Abstract
Harris develops a neo-Aristotelian account of practical and moral reasoning that does account for such decisions of good people. On this account moral reasoning is part of a larger practice of practical reasoning and is viable only if it integrates smoothly into this larger practice. Good people, on Harris’s view of them, have a number of kinds of concerns that are integrated in their practical reasoning dispositions. Persons with “integrity in the thick sense” care about their family members, their friends, about less intimate members of their communities and about “respectable” strangers from outside the community; they also care about having interesting things to do and meaningful work, and about doing some things in an excellent way. Insofar as people really care about any of these things, the satisfaction of the concerns produces a satisfying and meaningful life for the agent. So Harris’s theory is a kind of eudaimonism, though he points out that what people are seeking in pursuing these ends is the ends themselves—say, the well-being of friends or of respectable strangers or the well-turned musical phrase—and not something in addition called “happiness” to which these ends are means.