Abstract

In this book Harris intends to construct an agent-centered conception of morality grounded on a naturalistic understanding of practical reason. In order to achieve this goal, he contrasts his Aristotelian revisionist perspective with the traditional and internalist Kantian proposals, focusing on two specific matters: the opposition between agent-centered and agent-neutral norms, and the newer and very interesting discussion of symmetrical versus asymmetrical regulative norms. The first topic will be especially relevant for the rejection of traditional Kantianism, while the second will be the main argument against Kantian internalism. The author defends the thesis that some nouns have priority in some contexts and not in others against the context-insensibility of Kantian theories. In particular, giving a fair account of them and plenty of detailed argument to refute some of their aspects, he discusses Barbara Herman’s, Marcia Baron’s, Nancy Sherman’s, David Cummiskey’s, Christine Kosgaard’s, and John Rawls’s proposals.