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In Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons (eds.), Masses of Formal Philosophy. Automatic Press/VIP (2006)
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I suppose the natural way to interpret this question is something like “why do formal methods rather than anything else in philosophy” but in my case I’d rather answer the related question “why, given that you’re interested in formal methods, apply them in philosophy rather than elsewhere?” I started off my academic life as an undergraduate student in mathematics, because I was good at mathematics and studying it more seemed like a good idea at the time. I enjoyed mathematics a great deal. At the University of Queensland, where I was studying, there was a special cohort of “Honours” students right from the first year. You were taught more research-oriented and rigourous subjects than were provided for the “Pass” students. This meant that we had a small cohort of students, who knew each other pretty well, studied together and learned a lot. I could see myself making an academic career in mathematics. (I surely couldn’t see myself doing anything other than an academic career. Being around the university was too much fun.) However, there was a fly in the ointment. I was doing well in my studies, but I was losing the feel for a great deal of the mathematics I was doing. Applied mathematics went first, and analysis soon after. I could do the work, but I didn’t understand it. I wrote assignments by matching patterns from what I had written in my lecture notes, or what was in the text with what we were asked. In exams, I just bashed away at the problem, sometimes when asked in an exam to prove that A = B, I’d work at A from the top of a page and keep manipulating it until I’d got stuck. Then I’d work backwards from B, hoping to meet at somewhere rather like where I’d got stuck. If I was honest, I’d write “I don’t know how to get from here to there”. If I was dishonest, I’d just leave the transition unexplained. Knowing what I know now about marking assignments, it doesn’t suprise me that I did very well. The areas where intuition and understanding lasted the longest (and which were most fun) were topology, probability theory, combinatorics, set theory and logic..

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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

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Multiple Conclusions.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
Proofnets for S5: sequents and circuits for modal logic.Greg Restall - 2007 - In C. Dimitracopoulos, L. Newelski & D. Normann (eds.), Logic Colloquium 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151-172.
A note on naive set theory in ${\rm LP}$.Greg Restall - 1992 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33 (3):422-432.

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