Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’

Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):162-177 (2020)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT In our response Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’, we explore the methodology of Field's program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field's theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field's response to Restall’s [2010] ‘What Are We to Accept, and What Are We to Reject, While Saving Truth from Paradox?’

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Author Profiles

Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne
Rohan French
University of California, Davis

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References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Natural deduction: a proof-theoretical study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.

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