When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive

In Engaging Reason. International Phenomenological Society (1999)
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Abstract

One's sense of self and control over our actions and intentions shape the form and direction of one's life. We are responsible for not only our actions but also for all that which is our own and under our control. Raz explores the active/passive distinction for questions of responsibility and how our life becomes our own when it is under our control and guided by reason. We are ourselves when we are responsive to reasons—when we act for intentional reasons with respect to objects of value.

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10.1093/0199248001.003.0002

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Joseph Raz
Columbia University

Citations of this work

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Sincere Apologies.Margreet Luth-Morgan - 2017 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 46 (2):121-136.

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