A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/00048401003746009

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Russell on substitutivity and the abandonment of propositions.Ian Proops - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
Imaginability, morality, and fictional truth: Dissolving the puzzle of 'imaginative resistance'.Cain Samuel Todd - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):187-211.
An Actualist's Guide to Quantifying In.Agustín Rayo - 2012 - Critica 44 (132):3-34.
A simple solution to the hardest logic puzzle ever.Brian Rabern & Landon Rabern - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):105-112.
A Puzzle About Desire.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
How to solve the hardest logic puzzle ever in two questions.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):39-44.
Singular Propositions and the A Priori.Kai-Yee Wong - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:107-116.
A puzzle about truth and singular propositions.Aviv Hoffmann - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):635-651.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-23

Downloads
114 (#152,998)

6 months
13 (#184,769)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Agustin Rayo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Roger white’s argument against imprecise credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

View all 12 references / Add more references