The Pluralist 14 (2):112-117 (2019)

The concept of habit supplies one of the key ingredients not only of Charles Peirce’s philosophy, but of philosophical pragmatism more generally. In this volume, the emphasis is placed squarely on Peirce. The essays collected here represent the perspectives of a truly impressive group of Peirce scholars, working in a great variety of academic disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, biology, linguistics, anthropology, semiotics, literary studies, and aesthetics. This community of scholars is also broadly international, with essayists from a dozen different countries in Europe and North and South America. The result of their collective labor is a substantial and important book, one that illuminates not only...
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DOI 10.5406/pluralist.14.2.0112
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