Can Psychology Provide a Coherent Account of Human Behavior? A Proposed Multiexplanation-Model Theory

Behavior and Philosophy 25 (1):43 - 76 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Human behavior cannot be understood by using only models of explanation utilized in the natural sciences. Multiple models of explanation, which are not consistent with, or reducible to each other, are required and are in fact used in psychology to explain human actions. This situation, called "Multiexplanation," could cause a problem of developing a justified correspondence between psychological phenomena and multiple models of explanation. Unless this problem is solved, the explanatory capability of a psychological theory seems inconsistent and ad hoc. A solution suggesting "correspondence guidelines" between phenomena and available models of explanation and "organization guidelines" for constructing a coherent psychological theory is offered. It contributes to the development of a "multiexplanation-model theory" (or a "multimodel theory" for brevity) which employs different models of explanation needed for proposing accounts of psychological phenomena.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
Dretske on the Causation of Behavior.Constantine Sandis - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory.Lawrence Sklar - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (2):194-212.
When Mechanistic Models Explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
Towards a Theory of Models In Physical Science.John Forge - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:321-338.
The Social Constitution of Action: Objectivity and Explanation.John D. Greenwood - 1990 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
8 (#980,047)

6 months
1 (#415,900)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?