Standardized PUEBI EYD V’s Regularity in Formal Writing of Mathematical Existential Statement Consequences on Scientific Ontological Theorization to Indonesian Scientific Community

Proceeding of 10Th International Conference on Nusantara Philosophy (Icnp) 9 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper discusses the consequences of the latest PUEBI EYD V regulations for scientific ontological theorization through analyzing the semantical metaphysical commitment it reflects when we write formal mathematical statements using purely mathematical symbol (e.g., “there are 22 aardvarks”). This paper shows that PUEBI EYD V commits to mathematical Platonism metaphysically. This commitment brings harm to observable entities ontological nature in scientific theorization as shown in nominalism projects of philosophy of mathematics. Scientific theories - and even mathematical theories - should always reject the existence of independent objects for there exists only structures (as truth-value). Authors use nominalism stance as a methodology to reject the metaphysical commitment of PUEBI and defend the formal usage of writing mathematical statement without number symbols (“there are twenty-two aardvarks”, etc.).

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